The circumstances are dramatic. Russia’s brutal war on Ukraine has now raged on for three years, and then there is the uncertain economic condition of the West, particularly in Europe, where problems with innovation and energy prices undermine competitiveness.
In addition to this there is the troubling trade dependence on China, which, especially in the U.S., raises questions about the balance of power in the Pacific.
In this fraught time, identity-driven politics fueled by uncertainty pushes isolationist and protectionist solutions. This applies to both the U.S. and the more rhetorically cautious Europe. While such intuitive reactions to uncertainty and fear are psychologically understandable, they risk undermining the ability of Europe and the U.S. to defend their collective interests—particularly if the emotions driving today’s politics on both sides of the Atlantic get out of control.
Our problems are more shared than we often realize and require collective responses. Full alignment of interests between Europe and the U.S. cannot be expected—it wasn’t possible even during the pro-European Biden administration. But just because the far more provocative Donald Trump will soon enter the White House should not serve as an excuse to escalate old European prejudices.
Some American security appointments have raised justified concerns about the course of the war in Ukraine and, consequently, our security. The Republican Party has also indulged in isolationist sentiments, and this has also been reflected in the consequences.
While figures like Marco Rubio, with more mature views, hold key roles in the administration, this is not wholly reassuring. The genie of radicalism does not easily return to the bottle post-election. Besides, who within today’s Republican Party would want to put it back? The role of informal power circles in the new administration is another valid cause for concern, as their influence could be surprisingly significant, even in critical areas.
Nonetheless, when Donald Trump tells Europeans they "should do much more for security," it’s hard to disagree with him in principle. Europe’s unresolved problem lies in the strategic rationale for fulfilling this sensible demand. Poland, Central Europe, the Baltic states, and Scandinavia want to “do more for security” to sustain, renew, and strengthen NATO and transatlantic ties.
Meanwhile, some EU countries aim to “do more for security” by decoupling Europe from its transatlantic ties, believing this will make them truly “autonomous” and “European sovereign.”
I firmly believe Europe should be a self-reliant, sovereign, and autonomous entity. But the idea that by pooling our national sovereignty through the EU we strengthen ourselves, should also carry significant weight from a transatlantic perspective.
By 2025, when today’s uncertainties give way to practical relations, we must keep this in mind.
We know much more about the new U.S. administration’s trade plans. Concrete proposals for tariffs have already been made—primarily targeting Chinese products (60%) and Mexican goods (over 100%). Europe, too, faces protectionist measures, with tariffs of 20% proposed.
Given the increasingly evident economic dimensions of the Ukraine war, this issue cannot be considered in isolation.
U.S. protectionism is nothing new. President Joe Biden inherited tariffs introduced during Donald Trump’s first term. Towards Europe, confrontational measures included expanding the “Buy American” rule in public procurement and subsidy policies for clean technologies (IRA) and chip production.
At the same time, Biden de-escalated long-standing trade disputes with the EU, such as those over steel and aluminum, and the Boeing-Airbus conflict.
Establishing a functional U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) reflected the previous administration’s strategic interest in reducing costs for European allies. Counting goods, services, and investments, Europe remains the No. 1 trading partner for the U.S. and the majority of states. Our trade directly supports 16 million jobs on both sides of the Atlantic.
The real problem is China. Dependence on Chinese trade, particularly in strategic products, is a shared concern for Brussels and Washington. Hence, the U.S. promotes reshoring, while Europe favors a softer approach—de-risking. The difference arises from Europe’s greater value-added dependence on trade with China than the U.S.
Introducing high tariffs on Chinese products would redirect them to the EU—a significant challenge for Europe, which is more vulnerable to retaliatory Chinese measures. However, resolving Europe’s long-term competitiveness and risky dependence on China is a uniquely European task.
Europe struggles with effective innovation funding and the implementation of a consistent strategy due to fragmented regulations and a small budget.
Allocating a sum for innovation in Europe comparable to the scale of U.S. subsidies is possible but doesn’t happen because EU countries trust each other with only about 1% of GDP while in the U.S. the figure is far higher. This distrust is not unfounded. Poland’s experience with centrally managed EU funds has been largely negative, as funds tend to flow to old industrial centers, creating the impression of a renationalization of EU membership contributions.
The EU budget negotiations beginning in 2025 will reveal whether we can overcome these limitations.
Incidentally, the budget will be overseen by a Polish commissioner, Piotr Serafin, and Poland is traditionally vocal in the Council about its belief that—regardless of opinions on Donald Trump—what the West needs today is more unity and fewer tensions to address shared problems.
Poland will likely make significant efforts to ease tensions. It is credible in this regard. We have shown that on security issues, we contribute significantly to the West. We take NATO commitments seriously, and no one in Europe can accuse us of viewing the EU and NATO as mutually exclusive. Quite the opposite. We want both organizations to be strong and effective.
Warsaw is probably the only major European capital where Donald Trump’s administration and the U.S. president himself would not face street protests—a resource worth using one day.
That is, of course, if there is anything to discuss… But eventually, the dust of the early months of the new/old leaderships in Brussels and Washington will settle.
