Despite not holding a majority, the nationalist bloc could impact the policies that favoring Romania's EU and NATO membership.
Sovereigntists win—enough
The bloc is formed of three sovereigntist parties—the AUR (Alliance for the Unification of Romanians), SOS Romania, and POT (Young People's Party). The latter two have surpassed the 5% electoral threshold for securing representation in parliament while the AUR took 18%. Their combined result is about 33%, which represents a significant victory for a nationalist-nostalgic-sovereigntist trend that has tripled its score in four years, from 9.08% to its current level.
There is a discrepancy in growth rates: the AUR reached about 18% in Romania and over 26% in the Romanian diaspora, which was previously a stronghold of the centrist-progressive USR. A notable development is the support of POT for the extreme right presidential candidate Călin Georgescu, who won the first round of the presidential election. Like him, the party, which has deep religious tones, came to public attention following the first round of the presidential vote with an aggressive campaign on TikTok. Up until two weeks ago, POT and Georgescu did not even appear in the polls.
On a side note, in the initial round of the presidential vote, the two principal candidates representing the far-right (Georgescu and the AUR’s George Simion) garnered 36.8%. The general election results suggest that the sovereigntist coalition has diminished, potentially due to shifts in voter sentiment influenced by the campaign against Georgescu, a lack of representation by either party, or confusion among voters.
Mainstream parties rebuked
On the other side, the pro-EU, pro-NATO, and pro-Western parties have secured a majority of over 54%, which is poised to expand further following the seat redistributions. However, the stability and substance of these parties has undergone significant changes.
The PSD (Social Democratic Party) retained its first place, but with one of the lowest scores in 35 years: around 23%, just 4% more than its leader (and prime minister) Marcel Ciolacu got in the first round of the presidential elections.
The party saw support fall by about 10% on what it got in the local elections held in the summer, indicating that the PSD not only lost out to the sovereigntists but was also penalized for what is perceived as corrupt and party-centred governance. Ciolacu has not been a driving force for the party, nor has the party been a driving force for him. Based on statements made by Ciolacu on Tuesday the PSD seems tempted to gravitate towards the more extreme right. Furthermore, the PSD lost over 150,000 votes to a party with an almost identical name and a similar logo, the United Social Democratic Party, which received 1.81% of the votes.
On Monday morning, the party announced its intention to retain its hold over the post of prime minister, in a move that goes back on an agreement with the Liberals (their government partners since 2021) to appoint a Liberal as the head of government in a renewed coalition. This decision will make negotiations of any future government-building more challenging.
The USR (Union Save Romania) obtained a relatively modest score—approximately 13% in Romania and over 23% in the diaspora. Elena Lasconi, the party’s leader, is currently competing in the second round of the presidential election.
Since the European elections in the summer (when just got over 8%), the party has seen a notable increase in popularity, with Lasconi contributing to this growth. Furthermore, parties established by politicians who departed from the USR failed to meet the electoral threshold and will not be represented in parliament. Their votes will be redistributed. But the low score achieved by USR can be attributed, at least in part, to the division of the electoral pool. The party was unable to regain the support of its own electorate, lost in recent years due to internal scandals, splits, and an unassertive leadership.
The National Liberal Party (PNL) received a relatively low score of about 14%, which is below their result in the local elections in June (29%) but higher than their president and presidential candidate Nicolae Ciucă's score in the first round (8.8%). The selection of former prime minister Ciucă as a candidate failed to achieve the desired results. The PNL faced a backlash from its own electorate due to its prolonged alliance with its traditional arch-enemy the PSD, and mistakes made during its tenure and on the election campaign contributed to the party's performance. Similarly, the party lost voter support to the sovereigntists.
So the two mainstream parties, the PSD and the PNL, which have been in government for the last three years, have suffered at the hands of the electorate. The anti-establishment vote, which has been a driving force behind Romania's recent surge in sovereigntist sentiment and a unifying force for popular discontent, has delivered a resounding rebuke to them. The USR was also affected.
The UDMR (Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania) performed exceptionally well, securing 6.5% of the vote. This outcome reflects effective mobilization efforts and unexpected shifts in the political preferences of the Romanian electorate in Transylvania: one of the historically Liberal strongholds shifted its allegiance to the Hungarian candidates.
Government-building: PSD as cornerstone
The formation of a pro-EU, pro-NATO parliamentary majority is contingent upon the collaboration of the PSD, the PNL, the USR, and the UDMR. However, the PSD's potential alliance with the extreme right — not to be excluded at this moment — could prove to be a problematic and unproductive arrangement, resulting in the PSD's marginalization in the European Parliament and damaging the party's reputation. But the parliament being so fragmented that, regardless of which parties are excluded, the 50% majority will remain unattainable.
Two potential scenarios have emerged: a government of national unity (the PSD, the PNL, the USR, the UDMR, are in negotiations as I write) or a minority government supported in parliament by one of the three major parties. The likelihood of stability is low, as evidenced by the experience of recent years. Neither a PNL-USR nor the PSD-PNL combination has been able to deliver good governance. In fact, these combinations have been marked by the very quarrels that have pushed the electorate towards the extremes.
A four-party combination will present even greater challenges, particularly given the significant functional and ideological differences between the PSD and the USR, as well as between the PNL and the PSD. The option of a minority government supported by either the PSD or the PNL would be even more uncertain. Regardless of these idiosyncrasies, if they wish to maintain Romania's status within the EU, the parties are obliged to engage in negotiations and establish a majority and governing formula.
The PSD will likely seek the position of prime minister, which Marcel Ciolacu is again aiming for, particularly given the likelihood of him withdrawing his resignation as party leader at the urging of his colleagues. A coalition between the PSD, the PNL, and the UDMR would still require support from the USR in parliament to form a government.
The Liberals have hesitated, appearing prepared enough to also assume an opposition role, citing the elections as evidence that the alliance with the PSD has significantly eroded the party’s reputation. Yet, their interim leader, Ilie Bolojan, has called for the unwavering support of pro-EU forces. The USR has said that it will engage in negotiations with all parties, including the PSD, with the primary objective of securing support for candidate Lasconi in the second round.
A haunting menace: the second round
Discussions regarding the formation of a parliamentary majority are currently uncertain due to the pending presidential election. The most intense negotiations are centred on securing support for Elena Lasconi, with the outlook remaining indeterminate.
Following a vote recount conducted over the weekend (which did not alter the result) and the validation by the Constitutional Court (CCR) of the first-round result—contested on Thursday owing to massive evidence of foreign interference—polling data indicates that Georgescu has a 58% preference. The PNL expressed its unconditional support for Lasconi and has not changed position so far; but the PSD has said that given the diminished public sympathy for the party, they cannot guarantee whether the electorate will heed the call from the centre.
The PSD electorate is traditionalist and has expressed reservations about Lasconi, both as an individual and as a candidate. There has also been a notable level of contention between the USR and the PSD. A similar issue arises with the PNL electorate, which also has a conservative contingent. A poll revealed that 64% of Liberal and 60% of Social Democrat respondents preferred Georgescu's approach over Lasconi's. Even among supporters of the Hungarian party, 50.4% prefer this option.
Lasconi will require the support of the centre-right electorate, which has historically demonstrated mobilization in the second round against the PSD candidate. But the traditional dichotomy of "for or against PSD" is no longer a reliable indicator in this election. The outcome of the second round is highly uncertain, and a potential victory for Călin Georgescu would also, in the long term, require mainstream parties to prioritise quality governance.