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The report presented on Friday and prepared by the commission’s disinformation team, focused on the growing threat posed by Russian tactics to destabilize Poland and other Central European nations, particularly since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.
According to the report, Russia seeks to achieve “informational dominance” through a range of methods, including propaganda, disinformation campaigns, psychological operations, hacking attacks and infiltration of computer systems and networks.
These efforts, the commission said, are designed to undermine Poland’s political stability and its relationships within NATO.
The report said: “Russia aims to achieve informational dominance through misleading tactics and influencing social processes, debates, information systems and computer networks.”
According to the report, Russia annually spends up to $2 billion on these activities, with some estimates suggesting up to $4 billion per year on disinformation and propaganda.
One of the key findings of the report is that efforts to counter disinformation threats from Russia and Belarus have been “insufficient, temporary, inconsistent and often merely superficial” in recent years.
The commission criticized Poland’s counter-disinformation efforts as “insufficient, temporary, inconsistent and often merely superficial” and highlighted a lack of coordinated action and a failure to implement systemic strategies to combat Russian and Belarusian disinformation.
“Certainly, they lacked a long-term and systematic approach. No coordinated defensive measures were taken in the cognitive war waged by Russia and Belarus,” the report said.
It added that “the most significant active undermining of Poland’s and NATO’s defense in the cognitive war was the dismantling - even through physical intervention - of the NATO counter-intelligence expert center being developed in Warsaw.”
This center was intended to address the Russian Federation’s information warfare.
The commission also found that the NASK (Research and Academic Computer Network) institute, established to counter disinformation starting in late 2022, did not fully utilize its analytical potential. This failure to maximize the institute's capabilities further compounded the weaknesses in Poland’s defense against Russian propaganda and digital interference.
In response to these findings, the commission issued several recommendations aimed at improving Poland’s preparedness against disinformation threats. One key proposal was for increased cooperation between public authorities and the media, especially during crises, to prevent “information vacuums”. It also called for authorities to grant the media access to direct witnesses and uncensored visual materials during such events.
The commission also emphasized the need for a comprehensive disinformation counter-strategy that would include the input of experts, journalists and non-governmental organizations. This strategy should be backed by a substantial increase in public resources dedicated to countering disinformation campaigns.
“Above all, there is a need for a disinformation counter-strategy that incorporates the input of expert, journalistic and non-governmental communities,” the report concluded. “This entails increasing public resources dedicated to this objective.”
The commission’s investigation into Russian and Belarusian influence on Poland’s internal security was initiated in 2023 by the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) government. It covered the years 2007 to 2022, including the period when current Prime Minister Donald Tusk was in office.
In a related move, Tusk recently announced the creation of a new commission to investigate the years 2004-2024, a broader scope that will include the ongoing disinformation threats of the current decade.
This additional inquiry is part of Tusk's effort to address the growing concern over foreign influence on Polish democracy, especially as the nation faces increased security and political challenges in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
