America’s choice will determine if Ukraine continues to receive vital military aid, which is of direct importance for its ability to sustain effective defense. Likewise, the election will also have a major impact on the future of the North-Atlantic Alliance, the beacon of trans-Atlantic relations, which allowed the West to prevail in the Cold War and triumph over the Soviet threat.
Whilst the entire European continent is dependent on the maintenance of the American military foothold and security guarantees, the vulnerabilities of Central Europe are starker because of the region’s geographical proximity to Russia and Ukraine. Moreover, as historical precedents suggest, the fate of Central Europe is of broader consequence. After all, both the First and the Second World Wars started in the region. In both cases, America’s strategic choices had fundamental implications for Central Europe.
There is no doubt that the choice that America faces is deeply polarizing. On one hand there is liberal Vice-President Kamala Harris, a female of mixed ethnic origin and a Californian with public service record. On the other, former President Donald Trump, an old white male who is also a business tycoon representing an ever more radical populist agenda while criticizing globalisation.
As one ponders what the choice that America makes will mean for Central Europe it is far more predictable to ascertain the consequences of the election of Kamala Harris. Serving as vice-president since 2020, it is largely expected that if elected Kamala Harris will maintain the bulk of foreign policy choices of the outgoing administration of Joe Biden. This means that Harris is expected to maintain support for Ukraine and a strong commitment to transatlantic relations. Whether she would be able to deliver on those positions and, in particular, on funding for Ukraine may depend on the election to US Congress.
Leaving aside the issue of co-operation with Congress, which is notoriously unpredictable, a President Harris would be welcome news for those Central Europeans who are weary of Russia and committed to the Western alliance. In fact, Harris’s outreach to the Reagan Republicans and the endorsement of some leading conservative internationalist including former Vice-President Dick Cheney, his daughter, former Congresswoman Liz Cheney, and Arnold Schwarzenegger, may mean that Harris’s White House could actually be more hawkish towards Russia and drop some of the caveats that characterised Joe Biden’s support for Ukraine.
On the other hand, a return of Donald Trump to the White House, will be bad news for Ukraine and a worry for the European Atlanticist. Trump made it clear on several occasions that he does not respect Ukraine and prioritizes establishing good relations with Vladimir Putin
Ukraine. As disclosed by his former chief of staff, General John Kelly, whilst in office Trump wanted the U.S. to leave NATO. Had it not been for the opposition of his secretary of defense, General James Mattis, it is very possible that NATO would already have been seriously weakened during Trump’s first term. One can only imagine what this would have meant for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, launched in February 2022.
During Trump’s first term in office between 2016–2020, he, whilst no doubt radical in aspects of policy, still relied on experienced lieutenants when it came to foreign policy decisions, along with successive chiefs of staff, his defense secretaries, the heads of the armed forces and even his vice-president. These individuals – often referred to as ‘the adults in the room’ – were committed Atlanticists able to rein in some of Trump’s radical instincts. However, today Trump regards most of his former advisers as “traitors” and “losers”. It is therefore widely expected that another Trump presidency would be more radical with no adults in the room.
Trump’s choice of running mate, J.D. Vance, also suggests a more radical direction, especially in foreign policy. Vance has been opposing aiding Ukraine practically from the outset. Recently he unveiled his version of a “peace plan”, which foresees Ukraine giving up on the territories occupied by Russia and committing to not join NATO. The plan is largely considered a blueprint for how Trump’s administration would approach the war in Ukraine.
However, it is not exactly the case that the whole of Central Europe is united in supporting Ukraine and committed to the Western Alliance. Central Europe is very divided both between blocs of countries and internally within each of these nations. The attitude toward Donald Trump is in fact one of the main cleavages dividing the region. The Baltic States and Poland are the strongest supporters of Ukraine and committed Atlanticists. But even in Poland the current leader of the opposition, Jarosław Kaczyński, was happy to sport a MAGA hat and cultivate a close relationship with Donald Trump.
Meanwhile, the current leaders of Hungary and Slovakia, respectively Victor Orbán and Robert Fico, are banking on Trump winning the election and forging a populist alliance. There is also little doubt that should Trump prevail, other populist formations – for example in Romania and Bulgaria – would be catching a wind in their sails. Under this scenario, more governments in Central Europe would be likely to abandon support for Ukraine and work toward developing a close relationship with Donald Trump. The knowledge of Trump’s dislike of NATO and his likely investment in friendly relations with Vladimir Putin could result in more Central Europeans looking for accommodation with Russia.
